Revolution, particularly as originally proposed by Michael Roberts, who assigned it to the century 1560-1660. Crucially, Black ascribes all French military growth to Louis XIV's personal reign. The fact that he shifts the time period away from Roberts's original dates is of little consequence in itself, because others had done that before. However, much more essential, Black insists that the military expansion occurring after 1660 came only as the consequence of increased government capacity made possible by social and political compromises hammered out under Louis XIV. Therefore, Black reads out the army and war as causes of political change and instead reduces them to mere effects.
While controversy over the Military Revolution draws attention to military expansion during the mid-seventeenth century, Andre Corvisier requires historians to look again at the army that fought the last war of the Sun King. For years Corvisier has argued that the forces mobilized to fight the War of the Spanish Succession approached in size those raised by revolutionary France nearly a century later. Recently he restated this thesis in the first volume of the new Histoire militaire de la France.7 He constructs his argument by attaching additional contingents, including provincial militias and, strangely, the navy, to the 300,000 French troops he claims for the regular army. Corvisier's controversial mathematics seems to flow from his resolution to demonstrate both that a high percentage of the French male population was involved in the profession of arms and that a patriotic wave a la 1792 engulfed the France of the Sun King. In this last concern he follows the lead of Emile G. Leonard, who posited this view in the 1950s. 8 Revisionist challenges to traditional conceptions of army growth as they relate to the Military Revolution, state formation, and a "patriotic" effort under Louis XIV make a recalculation of military expansion necessary. Until the last few years it was acceptable to speak of army size by appealing to official financial and military statements, etats, but today an evaluation of army size demands a new methodology employing a wider range of source material.
Methodology: Distinctions and Sources
An effort to set the record straight must be very careful concerning exactly what is to be counted and the kinds of sources to be em-ployed. Trying to fix army size involves a good number of technical points, but many of them come down to not comparing apples with oranges. The first and the most basic difference to bear in mind is that between a field force and a state's entire army. A single field force, usually assembled in one location under one commander, only constitutes part of the total armed might of the state, which may have more than one army on campaign at the same time, while committing still other troops to garrison duty. As strange as it may seem, historians are forever muddying the distinction between the troops marshaled for a single battle and the army as a whole.
This leads to the question of who should be counted as part of an army. Obviously, field armies and garrison forces composed of regular troops must be included, but who else? Local and provincial militia who stayed at home to guard their towns and man their walls but were not supported by the monarchy and did not necessarily serve full time ought not to be tallied as royal troops. However, militiamen who after 1688 served the king at the front in their own or regular battalions belong in the totals presented here. Noncombatants traveling with the army pose another problem. Often discussions of early modern armies calculate the numbers of traders, women, and children who accompanied the troops; however, such camp followers will not be considered in this article. Neither do valets, pages, grooms, or other personal servants qualify.
In counting troop numbers, it is also important to differentiate when units are tallied. Above all, one must differentiate peacetime from wartime forces, because they differed in composition and size. By 1670, wartime tallies generally stood three times higher than the number of troops maintained between conflicts, and the fact that armies were much smaller during peacetime years meant that when conflicts began these forces had to expand, and, understandably, this took some time. Also, at the end of each war the government demobilized, or "reformed," individual soldiers, surplus companies, and entire regiments. Beyond these dramatic shifts, more subtle rhythms determined army size during times of conflict. The combat strength of military units normally fluctuated over the course of the year. Established regiments enjoyed their most complete complement just as they entered the campaign season in May or June, but battle casualties and losses from disease and desertion eroded numbers over the summer months. Winter quarters provided time for rest, refitting, and recruitment; as new levies arrived in late winter or early spring, units grew until they went off on campaign to repeat the cycle.
Not only does a careful accounting of army size need to bear in mind the nature of forces to be compared and the times when those forces are to be examined but also the different types of sources which provide the basis for such a study. In general this includes four varieties of records: (1) military ordonnances, (2) financial contr6les and etats, (3) review reports and routes, and (4) miscellaneous correspondence. A minute study of the first, military ordonnances, promises to reveal the decrees altering army size. In the nineteenth century, Victor Belhomme made the most thorough attempt to undertake this laborious feat. He charted the number of French regiments year by year, sometimes month by month, for the entire seventeenth century.9 However, the problem with employing military ordonnances is that, as in other aspects of government as well, official ordonnances may bear little relation to reality. In fact, Belhomme's figures are suspect, because they greatly exceed the levels generated by other sources before the late 1670s, by which time Louis and Louvois had imposed greater regularity on the system. Administrators also left behind a number of contemporary etats that supply numbers of troops for the army as a whole. Such etats come in several forms. A small collection known as the "Tiroirs de Louis XIV" were reports and planning documents in the king's own possession. In the majority of cases, however, official records stating the size of the entire army are financial documents generated as aids in estimating the cost of supporting the army in the present or coming year. Such financial contr6les provide a consistent and convenient source for the study of army size; therefore, generations of historians have uncritically appealed to them when judging army size. Yet the contr6les have recently come under attack. David Parrott questions their value, making the important and valid point that they were only financial documents designed to predict the amount of money that would be paid out by the monarchy for salaries and sustenance. Because troop sizes drawn from them are entirely theoretical, Parrott would completely discard them.10 But this goes too far. True, contr6les were statements of anticipated expenditures rather than head counts; however, the expenditures in question were figured as a given number of payments to a given number of troops. Therefore they were related to a projection of army size.
Financial controles retain important value as theoretical maxi- Review reports and etapes routes provide actual head counts of troops. Review reports were prepared by military bureaucrats for administrative reasons, as when distributing pay and rations to soldiers. Troops on the road traveling from place to place carried routes, documents that stipulated their route and the stops they were allowed to' make along the way. At each stop they were entitled to rations and lodging, so the routes stated exactly how many men of what ranks were to be fed and housed. By their nature, review reports and routes dealt only with individual units or small groups of units, rather than with an entire army, but they will be put to a broader use here. Because the actual sizes of units can be calculated from reviews and routes, these numbers can be used to estimate the percentage of regulation strength actually present under arms. Gross statements of army size can then be discounted by this percentage to yield a reasonable estimate of real troop numbers.
The last category of sources covers a varied range of documents that, though not systematic, can be very useful. In particular, when government officials discuss the king's forces in their letters and memoranda, they provide valuable corroboration of other sorts of documents, notably those financial controles that have come under attack. The use of sources in this manner underlines the fact that the best estimates of army size emerge from combining different sources and cross-checking whenever possible. In his dissertation, David Parrott makes a strong case that the Richelieu ministry bungled its way through the daunting task of supporting its army without engaging in substantial reform. Parrott believes that the army did not grow enough to impose reform upon the government; moreover, he seems to assume that if the army existed at a given size it had to be supported by the government at that size. Yet the French monarchy fielded armies larger than it could All the attention given here to figures should not obscure the point that the contrast between the army of the seventeenth century and that which preceded it was more than just a matter of how many more soldiers served Louis XIV than fought for Francois I. Beyond the simple question of size, the army changed in character over time, and it could be argued that this difference in character mattered as much or more than did numbers alone.
Consider, for example, the way in which armies were assembled, the time they remained together, and the rapidity with which they were dismissed. During the Italian Wars, French kings built their armies, particularly their infantry, from mercenary units which could be purchased "off the shelf." Thus in 1544, Francois I only concluded his contract with the Swiss in July, but this still gave them time to arrive and constitute the core of the Valois infantry at the camp de Jalons in late August and early September. Hiring Swiss or Landsknecht bands was more expensive than paying native French units on a day-to-day basis, but the mercenaries arrived fully armed and fully trained, ready to put in the line. When the threat ended, FranCois put them back on the shelf just as easily as he had taken them off it in the first place; thus a sixteenth-century army could be created for a particular campaign and then quickly dismissed.
In the seventeenth century all this changed. Although the Bourbons still recruited foreign troops, the great majority of the army was now made up of French regiments maintained permanently as a standing army or at least for the duration of a particular war. In 1544 the foreign infantry contingents in Francois I's main force amounted to as much as 80 percent of his foot soldiers.102 Yet by 1710 the number of foreign infantrymen in French service had sunk to 14 percent, and certain of these "foreign" units were from areas which, in fact, lay within the domains of Louis XIV.103 When war came, new recruits fleshed out established French regiments or stood to colors in entirely new units. In such a system, the government equipped the common soldier, fed him, and paid him while he learned and practiced his profession. Characteristically, it took many months for a seventeenth-century French army to be ready to go into action at full force, and regiments now served summer and winter, as long as the war lasted. Thus, the Bourbon state created and maintained an army in being, as opposed to assembling an army from "spare parts" for a single campaign. Over and above the great increase in numbers, saying that Franqois I mustered 80,000 troops in the fall of 1544 means something very different from saying that Louis XIV commanded 420,000 in 1696.
Conclusion
This article has charted the dimensions and development of one of those giants that dominated warfare by 1700. On the whole, earlier, traditional notions of French army growth have fared well in these pages, even though particular figures have been questioned or redefined. The two-step concept of French military expansion, first substantial under Richelieu and later spectacular under Louis XIV, emerges in a modified form but still intact. Louis XIII nearly doubled previous troop levels when he and his able first minister entered the lists against Spain. Later, the Sun King commanded wartime forces armies five to eight times greater than those that had fought for his Valois predecessors; perhaps even more important was the large standing army that remained in peacetime. Yet this recognition of dramatic army expansion under Louis XIV is qualified by the knowledge that his forces during the War of the Spanish Succession did not reach the proportions of those he had marshaled for the War of the League of Augsburg.
Most readers are, understandably, more interested in the implications of this army growth than in the mounting numbers themselves, yet time and space prohibit a discussion of their great political and social impact on these pages. But certainly any argument based on cause and effect must begin with knowledge of the timing and extent of that expansion. So here it is enough just to get the numbers and timing right, or as right as the current state of research permits.
